

FINAL REPORT

Inadvertent slide deployment incident of SriLankan Airlines

Flight UL1430, Airbus Industries A330-300, bearing registration 4R-ALP at parking Bay C21 at Bandaranaike International Airport, Katunayake on 23rd Jan 2021



Aircraft Incident Report

Contents

ABB	REVIATION
1.	Synopsis:
1.1.	Objective
2.	Factual information
2.1.	History of the flight:
2.2.	Damage to the aircraft: Nil
2.3.	Personnel information:
2.3.	1. Cabin Supervisor4
2.3.	2. Junior Aircraft Mechanic
2.3.	3. Duty Security Officer4
3.	Analysis:
3.1.	Security and Safety checks carried by the Cabin Supervisor:
3.2.	Pre- departure checks by Engineering:
3.3.	Security checks at passenger steps:
4.	Conclusion:
4.1.	Findings:
4.2.	Probable causes:
5.	Safety Recommendations:
Арр	endix – A – References on Cabin Defects under Safety and Emergency Procedures Manual
Арр	endix -B — References on Documentation Section under Safety and Emergency Procedure Manual 10
Арр	endix – C – Standard Operating Procedure for Aircraft Access Control Duty/Flight Guard Duty 1:
App	endix – D - The relevant page of the Register maintained by the Duty Security Officer



Aircraft Incident Report

Page 2 of 13

Issued on: 6-Sept-21

ABBREVIATION

CAASL - Civil Aviation Authority of Sri Lanka

CCC - Cabin Crew Certificate

CS - Cabin Supervisor

DGCA - Director General of Civil Aviation

FAP - Forward Attendant Panel

LT - Local Time

MEL - Minimum Equipment List

PIC - Pilot in Command

SEPM - Safety & Emergency Procedure Manual

SOP - Standard Operating Procedures

SRA - Security Restricted Area

VCBI - Bandaranaike International Airport, Katunayake, Sri Lanka

WSSS - Changi International Airport, Singapore



Inadvertent slide deployment incident of SriLankan Airlines Flight UL1430, Airbus Industries A330-300, bearing registration 4R-ALP at parking Bay C21 at Bandaranaike International Airport, Katunayake on 23rd Jan 2021

1. Synopsis:

SriLankan Airlines aircraft bearing registration number 4R-ALP, flight UL 1430 was scheduled to operate as a cargo flight from Bandaranaike International Airport, Katunayake, Sri Lanka (VCBI) to Changi International Airport, Singapore (WSSS) at 1130hrs (LT), on 23rd Jan 2021. Aircraft was parked at Bay C21 at Bandaranaike International Airport, Katunayake, Sri Lanka (VCBI).

After the aircraft doors were closed and the aircraft was ready to depart with two flight crew and a cabin supervisor. Just before pushback, the L1 door was opened from inside the aircraft and subsequently the slide pack fell on to the passenger step.

The incident was reported to the Civil Aviation Authority of Sri Lanka and accordingly an investigation was initiated.

1.1. Objective

The sole objective of this investigation is to reduce flight safety risks, prevent recurrence of similar incidents in the future with a view to enhance flight safety.

2. Factual information

A. Aircraft Type and Registration: A 330-300 / 4R - ALP

B. Flight no: UL 1430C. Sector: CMB-SIND. Date: 23-Jan-2021

E. Injuries: Nil

F. Nature of Event: L1 Slide Activation at the Parking Bay C21

G. Location: Bandaranaike International Airport,

Katunayake, Sri Lanka

2.1. History of the flight:

The flight UL 1430 which was scheduled to operate as a cargo flight from Bandaranaike International Airport, Katunayake, Sri Lanka (VCBI) to Changi International Airport, Singapore (WSSS) was parked at Bay C21 at VCBI, Sri Lanka on 23rd Jan 2021.

The flight crew and Cabin Supervisor (CS) who was the acting Purser on this particular flight boarded the aircraft together at 1030hrs (LT). On completion of cabin checks, after obtaining all required documents for the flight, the Cabin Supervisor (CS) had obtained approval from Pilot-in-Command (PIC) to close and arm the L1 door. Subsequently, L1 door was closed and



armed at 1113hrs (LT). The Cabin Supervisor went into the Flight Deck to obtain door armed confirmation from the Pilot in Command.

At that moment the Cabin Supervisor had heard a noise coming from the forward area of the aircraft (L1 Station). After checking that area she had observed that the L1 door was open and the slide pack was on the passenger step. The Junior Aircraft Mechanic was standing near to L1 door inside the aircraft.

This Incident had been reported by the Cabin Supervisor to the PIC, who had informed the Engineering Section of the Airline. There was a 41 minutes delay ex CMB due to this incident and the aircraft departed under the provisions of the Minimum Equipment List (MEL).

2.2. Damage to the aircraft: Nil

2.3. Personnel information:

2.3.1. Cabin Supervisor

Cabin Crew Certificate No: CCC/0281 issued by DGCA was valid till 17th June 2023.

Experience as a Cabin Crew member (Joined on 23rd Feb 2000): 07 Years and 05 Months

Experience as a Cabin Supervisor (since 01st Aug 2007): 13 Years and 05 Months

2.3.2. Junior Aircraft Mechanic

Experience in the post (joined on 31st March 2017): 3 Years and 09 months

2.3.3. Duty Security Officer

Experience in the post (joined on 11th Dec 2017): 3 Years and one month

3. Analysis:

3.1. Security and Safety checks carried by the Cabin Supervisor:

The Cabin Supervisor (CS) had boarded the aircraft along with the tech crew at 1030hrs (LT). After boarding the aircraft PIC had carried out pre-departure briefing and instructed CS to carry out safety and security checks of the galleys, lavatories and cabin. All open accesses to be latched and secured for take-off and landing & to keep the flight deck door closed. PIC had given the flying time of 3hrs 55 min.

While conducting checks, the cabin supervisor had noticed a few mechanics on board, and she had inquired from them whether anything was wrong with the aircraft. The Technicians had informed her that the Forward Microwave oven was inoperative and right side lavatory water pressure was low.

The Cabin Supervisor had carried out the safety check first. She had checked all safety equipment at her working station which is at L1 and the right hand side station. During the interview she stated that while doing these checks she had noticed the mechanics on board were disembarking.



After completing the safety check, she had carried out the security check to ensure that there are no hidden items such as bomb/ drugs or any unauthorized person hiding on board the aircraft. The security check was started from the rear of the aircraft and continued through the galley area, toilets towards the flight deck. The Cabin Supervisor stated that she did not see any person (mechanic) on board during this security check. Upon completion of the security checklist, she had handed it over to the PIC, as per the Standard Operating Procedures of the Company.

Cabin Supervisor had signed cleaning and catering Forms at 1108hrs and the Dispatcher had requested her to check with the PIC to close the L1 door. As per the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's), CS had checked with the PIC to close and arm L1 door. PIC had given his permission to do so.

According to the Company SOPs, Cabin Supervisor is required to make a PA announcement and during the interview she stated that she had made a PA announcement requesting all ground personnel to disembark from the aircraft. Further during the interview with First Officer it was revealed that the PA announcement was heard in the flight deck quite softly.

As per the Statement by the CS, she had just looked at the cabin from L1 station without physically checking the right hand side cabin from R1 door area and closed the L1 door and armed it. The CS checked whether L1/R1 doors were armed on the Forward Attendant Panel (FAP). After checking the FAP, CS had remained in the Flight Deck until pushback.

At this moment, she had heard a noise and had gone back to check. She had seen the L1 door opened by a Junior Aircraft Mechanic, and the slide pack had fallen on to the step. She then informed the PIC, who informed the Ground Engineer. The Ground Engineer (Approval Holder) had requested PIC to open R1 door at around 1204hrs (LT).

3.2. Pre- departure checks by Engineering:

The Junior Aircraft Mechanic who was assigned to 4R ALP aircraft, had completed his duties on board and while leaving the aircraft he noticed two life vest covers, with the life vests in Business Class, had detached from their fixtures. Therefore, he had gone to the Business Class to carry out the repairs without informing anyone. The Junior Aircraft Mechanic stated during the interview that he had not heard any PA announcement instructing ground personnel to disembark. He was unaware that the L1 door was closed and armed.

The Approval Holder, who was holding the passenger steps at L1 door on the Apron, informed the Junior Aircraft Mechanic who was in the Business Class, attending to repairs, through a phone call, to disembark as the aircraft was ready to depart.

The Junior Aircraft Mechanic had rushed to the L1 door and without checking the door armed/disarmed condition, had opened the L1 door. The moment the L1 door was opened in the arm mode, Junior Aircraft Mechanic heard a noise, and the slide pack fell on to the passenger step.



The aircraft was dispatched under MEL, and dispensation was obtained from the Engineering Quality Manager. R1, L2 & R2 doors were armed for departure.

3.3. Security checks at passenger steps:

The security checks by the Security Officer(s) is the final defence at the aircraft to ensure unauthorized personnel do not board the aircraft, or no prohibited items are taken on board. As per the approved SOP, the Duty Security Officer is required to screen all authorized personnel entering/leaving, permit entry only to authorized personnel and maintain records of such persons on entering and leaving times, etc.

The Duty Security Officer who was assigned for this flight had to maintain a record of in / out of the personnel who attend to the maintenance, cleaning or security duties of the aircraft. The aircraft mechanics who attended to the maintenance of the aircraft, disembarked from the aircraft for short periods to carry out various types of work and again boarded the aircraft depending on their assigned tasks. It was revealed during the investigation, as a practice, the duty security officers do not record the in/out time of technical personnel who attend to aircraft matters for very short periods. It was observed that the "IN" time was recorded but the "OUT" time of the concerned Junior Aircraft Mechanic was not recorded in the record maintained by the Duty Security Officer.

Furthermore, it was revealed during the investigation, that the subject Duty Security Officer who was to be at the passenger steps was assigned other duties, which caused him to miss out on his assigned tasks at the bottom of the passenger steps throughout the required time period.

4. Conclusion:

4.1. Findings:

During the investigation carried out by CAASL, the following were observed;

- The Cabin Supervisor had not made any entries of using the "No Exit" cards in the Cabin defects logbook as per paragraph 2.13.2.1 of approved Safety and Emergency Procedure (SEP) Manual of SriLankan Airlines, which is attached as Appendix A to this Report.
- 2. The Cabin Voyage Report was incomplete as the Cabin Supervisor had not completed all necessary areas regarding the incident as required by Paragraph 2.13.2.2 of approved Safety and Emergency Procedure (SEP) Manual of SriLankan Airlines, which is in Appendix A.
- 3. Cabin Safety Incident Report had not been completed by the Cabin Supervisor according to the sequence of events as required by paragraph 2.34 of the approved Safety and Emergency Procedure (SEP) Manual of SriLankan Airlines, which is attached as Appendix B to this Report.
- 4. The Junior Aircraft Mechanic had not followed the accepted procedure when opening the Passenger/ Crew Door, which is a non-compliance to AMM-52-10-00-010-801-A "Opening



of the Passenger/ Crew Door".


- 5. The Junior Aircraft Mechanic did not keep anyone informed that he was going to carry out a repair in the cabin.
- 6. CAASL approved SOP (SRA- SOP-02) is available for the security officers who perform duties at the ladder point, which is attached as Appendix C to this Report.
- 7. The Duty Security Officer assigned for this aircraft had to attend to other security duties which was more than the tasks assigned in the particular SOPs.
- 8. The mechanics had disembarked and boarded the aircraft on many occasions. It was observed that the Duty Security Officer had not recorded the out time of the concerned Junior Aircraft Mechanic in the register as he attended to some other duties at the time the Junior Aircraft Mechanic disembarked from the aircraft, which is attached as Appendix D to this Report.

4.2. Probable causes:

- (a) Non-adherence to the Standard Operating Procedure by the Cabin Supervisor to arm the slides just prior to aircraft pushback and non-adherence to the Standard Operating Procedure to open the Passenger/Cabin door by the Junior Aircraft Mechanic were considered as probable causes for this incident.
- (b) Lack of situational awareness by the Cabin Supervisor and the Junior Aircraft Mechanic had also contributed to this incident.

5. Safety Recommendations:

- 1. The Airline shall ensure as a safety mitigation the "Door Arming "Procedure of the approved Safety and Emergency Procedure Manual to be amended as follows. "The Arming of door slides to be carried out ONLY after the aircraft commences push back".
- 2. The Airline shall ensure that the concerned Cabin Supervisor be re-trained on Accident / Incident Report and Cabin Voyage Report writing as required by Chapter 13 .9 (a) of SLCAP 4305, Cabin Crew Training Standards.
- 3. The Airline shall ensure that the Dispatcher confirms to Purser/Cabin Supervisor that all ground /security procedures complete, all the ground personnel have disembarked from the aircraft and the aircraft is ready for departure.
- 4. The Airline shall carry out a security check in the cabin by Purser/Cabin Supervisor, prior to closure of the door after obtaining confirmation from the Dispatcher and making the announcement for "ground personnel to disembark from the aircraft".





- 5. The Airline shall have a documented procedure in place to inform operating Purser or Cabin Supervisor by the senior engineering staff member when maintenance work is to be carried out, and the number of engineering staff are on board, prior to commencing such maintenance work.
- 6. The Airline shall ensure that the Engineering Staff responsible to issue the Certificate of Release to Service (CRS), prior to the release of the aircraft, shall ensure that all staff detailed to work inside the aircraft have disembarked prior to closing doors.
- 7. The Airline shall carry out a familiarization on door opening/ closing for all engineering staff.
- 8. The Airline shall ensure that technicians /mechanics to consult cabin crew, if doors are required to be opened or closed when crew are on board.
- 9. The Airline shall ensure an indoctrination training to be provided to all newly recruited engineering staff, with in depth training on operating of passenger/cabin doors.
- The Airline shall ensure, during recurrent training similar incidents are highlighted.
- 11. The Airline shall ensure similar incident are highlighted during daily internal briefings.
- 12. The Airline shall ensure that the Security Officers deployed for aircraft security duties should not attend to any other duties except the task assigned in the particular SOPs.
- 13. The SOP (SRA-SOP-02) needs to be reviewed and updated including the following.
 - a. The Duty Security Officer deployed at the ladder point should record the details of personnel who board and disembark the aircraft on each occasion.
 - b. The Duty Security Officer shall immediately contact the Designated Aircraft Engineer assigned to the aircraft and ground operations room, if he/she observed that persons who are required to disembark are still onboard, in order to inform the PIC.



Appendix – A – References on Cabin Defects under Safety and Emergency Procedures Manual

	SAFETY AND EMERGENCY	MN/CSS/02
	PROCEDURES MANUAL	Issue No: 03
	PROCEDURES MANUAL	June 2014
		Chapter 02
Srilankan	GENERAL PROCEDURES	Page 49

2.13.2.1 Cabin Defects

Log Book - Cabin Defects Log Book is located in the flight deck or next to LI crew seat (depending on the type of aircraft). The Purser shall go through it as a pre departure duty and inform the CCMs of any pending defects. He shall liaise with the Ground Engineer to rectify any pending defects. In the event a discrepancy is observed/ reported during the pre-departure checks, the Purser shall inform the Ground Engineer and carry out an entry in the Cabin Defects logbook. The Ground Engineer shall read and comment on all reported defects prior to signing off the aircraft for airworthiness.

CIDS - Any alerts on the FAP shall be checked by the Purser, communicated to the PIC and informed to the Ground Engineer for rectification prior to departure as per the MEL.

All cabin defects observed by CCMs, during pre-flight/in-flight and post-flight should be recorded, dated and signed by the Purser.

2.13.2.2 Voyage Report

The Voyage Report is a mandatory document to be completed for all flights operated. The Purse shall be responsible and shall enter all details of concerns of the voyage. CCMs shall sign and confirm reporting/designated working positions and other related responsibilities by placing the signature.

2.13.2.3 Safety And Security Checks

Purser shall ensure the safety equipment/ survival and the security check of the aircraft is carried out prior to the passenger boarding.

On completion of the checks, CCMs shall confirm the checks carried out by placing the signature on the Voyage Report. The Cabin Supervisor shall ensure the safety and survival equipment in the area under his preview is as per MEL, complete the form by counter signing and hand over the completed form to Purser.

If a door assists is not detailed, the Door Primary shall carry out the checks and tick the relevant column and inform the CS in the area prior to his signature. Any irregularities shall be communicated to the Purser at the earliest.

Ref 2.34


2.13.2.4 Pre-Departure Safety/Security Check List - PSSCL


The Purser shall fill the Pre-Departure Safety/Security Check List sign and present it to the PIC informing him on the checks carried out and the observations/in the event of

Revision No:	00	Revision Date :	00
Prepared By:	Cabin Safety	Approved By:	CAASL



Appendix -B – References on Documentation Section under Safety and Emergency Procedure Manual







Appendix – C – Standard Operating Procedure for Aircraft Access Control Duty/Flight Guard Duty

	SECURITY & INVESTIGATIONS DEPARTMENT	CHAPTER 2
SriLankan	STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE FOR AIRCRAFT ACCESS CONTROL DUTY / FLIGHT GUARD DUTY	Page 2

PURPOSE OF MEASURES;

- (a) Ensure the security of the aircraft
- (b) Prevent / detect / apprehend taking any explosive device / weapon / unauthorized items on board and unauthorized removal of items from the aircraft.
- (c) Prevent / detect / apprehend entering of unauthorized personnel to the aircraft.
- (d) Prevent / detect any damage to the aircraft.
- (e) Extend due care to customers.


DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES:

- (a) Screen all authorized personnel entering / equipment / items / taking to the aircraft by physically / using electronic / mechanical equipment, body searching or security searching.
- (b) Screen all personnel when leaving the aircraft.
- (c) Permit entry only to authorised personnel and/or items and maintain records.
- (d) Conduct observation / monitoring on all movements relevant to flight departure.
- (e) Conduct surveillance in the aircraft site.
- (f) Perform any other duties as required.
- (g) Should be attired in uniform when on duty.



Appendix – D - The relevant page of the Register maintained by the Duty Security Officer

	Elwa	5/20	Dome	In	ant	Den	22	at.
7	est 16	181 15	o m. RAJu visa	24	du	_ >n b	r-	1 1
618	Ins I	SA SM	subspingle all 1	in to	sh As	wickliamen	the	
, ,	701 hs	7.5h 5	"busingle" To A. a	gran Br	m Sla	wecklemmand	three	- 1
	6.4		Rovel		1730	Tech	8_	Z_
	3	- transfer and a second	Chelkh	17154	1735	Sed	1	V.
	5	20205		1806	1800	Tech	89	Ğ.
-	4	2179	Ranel	1826	19K	SLCS	0	4
	5	19040	Migana .	1830	190)	JiBlight	K	0
	0	11938	Sudoth	1830	1912	AIS	#	1
7	4		N. Ssendea	1.0.05	1917	SLES	0	_
6	19291	Colored to the Second Colored	28 Ale Depa	bush	Brown	A01 -		
1.2	021 a	0817h	W VC1429 A/C	Arrive o	From	Bom to C-	21 -1	24-0
			LAC Fenando				-	-
	koj	30438	(pc Jayarathin	٠,	J .	SLAF	_	-
20	21. at	0830 h	7 s/a mps mon	rasings	e 16	earing for	037 d	adys
cla	44 H/	0 to 81	a HARP Guneril. G	ka. d	ay sh	14 - 6	-	-
1/2	l a	108301	I S/A HARP	Grunas	laka	7/0 8/6	ALP	-
-)	1	510	Marai-ha				_	-
	0.1929	21371	Milroy	0858	0940	A/c Tech	1	. 8
	. 57	23413	Silvin	0913		A/c Tech	N	S 4
	12	16037	Fndo	0925	0948	FT6 OPS	B	1
	22	20573	Vihanao	2 09305	20,35	3 Secops	-	
	9)	93458	Madusanka	J		D	0	1
	9	18630	Shivantha	0933	1020	TeC	8	B







Members of investigation held at CAASL

Mr. Saman Gunewardena Deputy Director General/ Flight Safety Regulations Capt Lushan Fernando Director Aircraft Operations

Capt. N A Keil

Designated Senior Civil Aviation Inspector -

Aircraft Operation

Mr. Ajith Dewaraja

Senior Civil Aviation Inspector - Airport

Security

Ms. Samudra Chandraratne

Manager – Aviation Safety Monitoring

Ms Anushka Don Carolis

Civil Aviation Inspector Aircraft Cabin Safety